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EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND EMPLOYMENT
PREFERENCE: WHO IS AN INDIAN?
Karl A. Funke*
If the great spirit had desired me to be a white man, he would
have made me so in the first place. He put in your heart certain
wishes and plans, in my heart he put other and different desires.
Each man is good in his sight. It is not necessary for eagles to
be crows.-Sitting Bull, Sioux, 1883
The United States Constitution confers upon Congress the power "to
regulate commerce ... with the Indian tribes."1 The United States
Supreme Court determined a century ago that this constitutional
grant embraced regulation of individual Indians as well as Indian
tribes, and that congressional power could reach Indians not only
within reservation areas set aside for their use, but anywhere within
the United States.2 In addition, the High Court has long held that
federal authority over Indian affairs is plenary and thus extends
beyond strict "commerce ' 3 concepts to include any legislation that
is "reasonably essential to their [the Indians'] protection."4
In the exercise of its guardianship power over and duty to American
Indians, Congress has enacted a multitude of statutes generally appli-
cable to "Indians" and Indian tribesY Virtually none of these laws
have defined the term "Indian" or "Indian tribe" with any specificity.
Thus, definition implementation of these enactments, in terms of
ascertaining the class of contemplated beneficiaries, has been dele-
gated historically to the primary federal administrative guardian or
trustee of Indians, the Secretary of Interior, and his chief lieutenant,
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.0
This article will examine the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
with regard (1) to whom it was intended to apply, particularly in the
area of to whom employment preference was to apply, and (z) the
extent to which the Secretary of Interior and HEW have faithfully
executed the congressional will in this regard.
* B.S. Central Michigan University, 1972; J.D. Antioch School of Law, 1975.
Member, Michigan Bar. Task Force Specialist, Task Force on Law Revision, Consoli-
dation, and Codification, American Indian Policy Review Commission, U.S. Congress.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to John D. Ross III (Consultant, Ameri-
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Johnson-O'Malley Act Eligibility in Historical Perspective
The contracting section of the Johnson-O'Malley Act (JOM)
provides the following:
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, to
enter into a contract or contracts with any State or Territory, or
political subdivision thereof, or with any appropriate State college,
or school, or with any appropriate State or private corporation,
agency, or institution, for the education, medical attention, agri-
cultural assistance, and social welfare, including relief of distress,
of Indians in such State or Territory, through the agencies of the
State or Territory or of the corporations and organizations here-
inbefore named, and to expend under such contract or contracts,
moneys appropriated by Congress for the education, medical atten-
tion, agricultural assistance, and social welfare, including relief of
distress, of Indians in such State or Territory."
The language of the Act is very broad and uses the undefined
phrase "Indians in such State or Territory." The Bureau of Indian
Affairs' regulation in effect up until October 24, 1975, purporting to
implement this language, defined the class eligible for JOM funds
as follows:
"Indian" means an individual of / or more degree of Indian blood
and a member of a tribe, band, or other organized group of Indians,
including Alaska Natives, which is recognized by the Secretary of
the Interior as being eligible for Bureau of Indians Affairs services.,
The regulations imposed a twofold eligibility requirement of one-
fourth or more Indian blood and membership in a federally recog-
nized community of Indians.9 These requirements are not contained
in the express language of the Act. It is my view that administrative
authority to adopt such requirements cannot be reasonably inferred
from the statutory language and that the regulations were inconsis-
tent with the intent of Congress. Moreover, the legislative history of
JOM is sparse in discussing to whom the funds are intended to apply.
The legislative history specifically states that the purpose of JOM
funds was to service Indians in states where the "tribal life is broken
up."'1 Indians of states where the tribal structure has been largely
broken up are not very likely to be members of any federally recog-
nized Indian community or structure. The two concepts are in reality,
if not by definition, incompatible with one another.
The language, ". . and which the Indians are to a considerable
extent mixed with the general population,"" further demonstrates
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that JOM funds were intended to be expended for nonreservation
Indians. A 1949 opinion from the Solicitor, Department of the In-
terior, tended to support this view. The opinion states:
The primary purpose of the Johnson O'Malley Act is to enable this
Department to enlist the cooperation of States in rendering the
social services mentioned in the act to Indians who are so inter-
mingled with the general population of a state that it is not
practical or economical for the Department to maintain separate
services for them. 2
Because of the situation which developed as a result of the allot-
ment policy and the Indian Service policy of dealing with Indians on
an individual basis, it is very doubtful that tribal membership was
intended as a requirement of eligibility. JOM was considered as a
latter step in a series of steps in civilizing the Indian and attempting
to dissolve the "tribal mass." It would have been incongruous for
Congress to have intended Indians to be members of a tribal struc-
ture which the federal government had been designedly trying to
extinguish.
Up until 1957 off-reservation Indians were receiving JOM assis-
tance as the Act had originally intended. However, in the 195o's the
policy of the federal government began to shift. The BIA and the
Congress began to look to the eventual termination of the special
trust relationship between the federal government and the Indian
tribes. The BIA began terminating its services to Indians. In 1957
the JOM regulations, reflecting this change in policy, began to limit
eligibility for JOM assistance to reservation Indians.' 3
The BIA also, by past and present regulation, imposes a or more
Indian blood requirement for entitlement to JOM funds. 14 There
is nothing in the legislative history which indicates such an intent.
The prevailing administrative practice at the time of enactment of
JOM, and for some time thereafter, was to "consider a person who
is of Indian blood and a member of a tribe, regardless of degree of
blood, an Indian."' 5
Other statutes enacted around the same time that JOM became
law specifically provided a minimum Indian blood quantum if one
was intended. For example, the Indian Reorganization Act 16 of 1934
(IRA) defined three categories of Indian for purposes of the Act.
The first two categories concerned tribal Indians and did not contain
any minimum blood quantum, while the third category concerned
nontribal Indians and nonfederally recognized Indians and specified
a one-half or more Indian blood quantum. 7
IRA and JOM were enacted within two months of one another by
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1976
the same Congress. It would seem logical that if this Congress,
which had very carefully provided a definition for IRA, had intended
a blood quantum definition for JOM, it would have provided one
in the Act. As just discussed, the practice at the time of enactment of
the JOM and the IRA was to define "Indian" without regard to
blood quantum unless the statute specifically provided one.',
Based on the historical evidence and the legislative history of JOM,
the BIA regulations which restricted the class of eligible beneficiaries
did not appear to be consistent with the intent of the Act. The
historical evidence and legislative history strongly indicate that Con-
gress had recognized a trust responsibility to those individual Indians
who had, as a result of the allotment policy, lost their tribal relations
and were dispersed into the general white population.
The historical climate in which the original JOM Act was enacted
and its legislative history both strongly suggest that JOM funds were
not to be limited to reservation Indians or Indians who retained
their tribal ties. The evidence indicates that JOM funds were prin-
cipally directed to nonreservation Indians-Indians who had once
been members of tribes but now were dispersed into the general
population.
The New Definition for JOM Funding
In January of last year, the Indian Self-Determination and Educa-
tion Assistance Act'9 was signed into law. This Act is designed to
implement Indian self-determination by allowing tribes and tribal
organizations to contract for and oversee the planning, conduct, and
administration of educational and other federal services provided to
Indians by the federal government.
The Act contains a definition of "Indian" for purposes of the Act:
"'Indian' means a person who is a member of an Indian tribe. '20 Also
included in the Act is a definition of an "Indian tribe":
"Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other
organized group or community... which is recognized as eligible
for the special programs and services provided by the United States
to Indians because of their status as Indians.'
A plain reading of the Act indicates that the definition of "Indian"
used therein is intended to define who is eligible for JOM funding.
However, the BIA has recently indicated that it does not view the
definition used in the Act as binding in terms of defining who is an
"Indian" for purposes of JOM funding. The Deputy Commissioner
of Indian Affairs for Education has indicated that the BIA Education
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Office views the definition as binding only in terms of defining who
is an "Indian" for purposes of determining to whom a contract to
provide the services may be awarded and not for purposes of deter-
mining who is eligible to receive those services.22 However, a BIA
Task Force prepared regulations to implement Public Law 93-638.
The regulations contain a one-fourth or more Indian blood quantum
requirement for eligibility for JOM funds.
Because contracts are to be awarded to tribes or tribal organiza-
tions and because tribal membership may or may not be limited to
Indians of one-fourth Indian blood, there is no way to effectively
limit the awarding of contracts to Indians of one-fourth or more
Indian blood. If a one-fourth or more Indian blood quantum is
imposed as an eligibility requirement upon the recipients of the
services, problems are almost sure to result. The Indian employees
of the contractor (Indian tribe or organization) may be less than
one-fourth blood Indian. If this occurs, the Indians planning and
administering the program may be ineligible for the very programs
they are running. Another difficulty would be presented by placing
the tribe in the position of providing services to some of its members
and denying services to others.
The definition of "Indian" in Public Law 93-638 should be applied
across the board for both contracting and eligibility for the JOM
educational funds. The Act specifically amends JOM and it would be
inconsistent with the plain language of Public Law 93-638 and
common sense to administratively impose a one-fourth or more
Indian blood requirement on eligibility for JOM educational funds.
The new definition provided by Public Law 93-638 requires mem-
bership in a federally recognized Indian tribe or group. In this sense,
the new definition modifies considerably the class of eligible Indians
entitled to JOM. The membership requirement makes ineligible
many Indians who would have qualified under the originally ex-
pressed intent of the 7 3d Congress back in 1934. The 9 3d Congress
apparently passed the more restrictive definition without knowledge
of the educational history leading up to enactment of JOM in 1934.
Preference in Employment Under the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
At the present time there are a number of federal statutes which
provide for preference in the employment of Indians within the
Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service (IHS).
The principal statute concerned with implementing Indian prefer-
ence is the Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 193423
5
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(IRA). The IRA was one of the most important pieces of legislation
affecting Indians ever passed by the United States Congress. The
enactment of the IRA reflected a major reversal of the federal govern-
mental policy and approach to Indian affairs.24
The current practice of both BIA and IHS is to restrict preference
to Indians who are both one-fourth or more Indian blood and who
are members of a federally recognized tribe. It is my opinion that the
current administrative practice is not in compliance with the statu-
tory language or the legislative intent of the Act.
At the present time there are three administrative appeals on this
very issue being reviewed by the Solicitor's Office in the Department
of the Interior. As a consequence of these appeals, the Solicitor's
Office is reviewing in depth the issue of who is entitled to IRA
preference. The probable result will be a complete revision of the
Indian preference standards presently used by BIA and IHS. It is
uncertain at the present time what the new standards will be and
to what degree they will comply with the congressional intent of
the IRA.
Federal Indian Policy Prior to the IRA
Prior to the passage of the IRA, the Indian was virtually controlled
by a federal bureaucracy which attempted to destroy the tradition
and culture of Indians and assimilate them into the mainstream of
American society. This discretionary power was often excessively
abused by administrators within the Indian Office. Congressman
Howard, Chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs and
sponsor of the IRA House bill, recounted the effects of this abuse
of power:
Although many thousands of Indians are living in tribal status on
the various reservations, their own native tribal institutions have
very largely disintegrated or been openly suppressed, and the entire
management of Indian affairs has been more and more concen-
trated in the hands of the Federal Indian Service. The powers of
this Bureau over the property, the persons, the daily lives and
affairs of the Indians have in the past been almost unlimited. It has
been an extraordinary example of political absolutism in the midst
of a free democracy-absolutism built up on the most rigid bureau-
cratic lines, irresponsible to the Indians and to the public; shackled
by obsolete laws; resistant to change, reform, or progress; which,
over a century, has handled the Indians without understanding or
sympathy, which has used methods of repression and suppression
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unparalleled in the modem world outside of Czarist Russia and
the Belgian Congo.25
During this pre-IRA period the federal government, through a
course of legislative, executive, and administrative action, had
usurped the sovereign powers of the Indian tribes26 and had pursued
policies which forced the disintegration of the political, social, and
cultural existence of Indian people.
The general attitude of the federal officials is reflected in this
passage written by a former Chief Counsel of the Indian Office:
When the Indian Reorganization Act was enacted in 1934 a large
number of Indian Service officials, including superintendents and
chiefs of divisions in the agencies and central office, were skeptical
of its success; in fact there were some who did not believe in Indian
self-government. During several previous decades some important
officials of the Service were luke warm, or even unfriendly to many
tribal councils. These employees, consciously or unconsciously,
relegated Indian organization to the background. They absented
themselves from council meetings. Indian leaders frequently were
not advised of reservation programs and other important facts.
Often they were not consulted in the formulation of reservation
plans. The attitude of the local administration in such cases may
be likened to that of a colonial administrator who feels a keen sense
of duty as a superior over an inferior people whose lives he controls.
The feeling that Indians are not prepared to handle their own
affairs, though prompted by high motives, may result in a display
of paternalism towards the Indians which they will deeply resent.
Any mistakes of tribal governments, which supported the pre-
conceived idea that Indians were unfit, loomed large. Achieve-
ments, by the same mental process were forgotten. Fear was
manifest among a few that their own power would be to a great
extent jeopardized by another body having something to say about
the management of the reservation. They betrayed an obvious
annoyance when the council made recommendations concerning
matters which they regarded as peculiarly a governmental respon-
sibility, one within their purview, of course. While there has been
great progress, there is still room for improvement.27
This effort to usurp and destroy the inherent powers of tribal self-
government and to obliterate the customs and culture of the various
tribes was deeply facilitated by the General Allotment Act of 18872
and the numerous special allotment acts patterned thereon. These
acts ratified so-called "agreements" between the federal government
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and the various tribes; in fact, Indian consent to such agreements
was coerced in many instances.29 Under these acts individual Indians
were allotted a certain parcel of the tribe's communal reservation
land which was to be held thereafter in severalty. It was projected
that by introducing the Indian to individual ownership of land he
could be more quickly assimilated into the white culture. The lands
which were not allotted were fictitiously designated "surplus" lands
and were sold to whites.30
This dispossession of reservation land, coupled with the arbitrary
and paternalistic governmental authority which continued to be
exercised over Indians, resulted, as intended by Congress, in the con-
tinuous disintegration of the tribal structure. However, the assimila-
tionist aims of the allotment acts were not realized. To the contrary,
from 1887 to 1934, Indians became a disorganized and scattered
people whose economic, cultural, and physical security was rapidly
being destroyed.3
Employment Preference Prior to the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
There were a number of statutes providing for employment prefer-
ence for Indians prior to 1934.32 The general policy 3 of according
employment preference to Indians in the Indian Service dates back
to at least 1834,34 one hundred years prior to the IRA. None of these
pre-i934 statutes defined the term "Indian," but rather spoke only of
"Indians" or "persons of Indian descent." Preference was also pro-
vided by presidential Executive Order.3 5
These early Indian preference statutes did little in the way of
securing more positions for Indians in the Indian Service because,
in part, Indians were forced to compete with non-Indians under
Civil Service standards,36 while at the same time the Indians were
denied or did not have access to education and were accorded no
merit for the life knowledge and skill obtained outside of the stan-
dards of formal education.
The establishment of criteria for determining who was a member
of the preferred class or "Indian" was left to the federal executive
and administrative officials. Apparently, these officials did not estab-
lish any definitional limitations upon who was entitled to Indian
preference until 1929. The history of the early preference criteria
was recently traced in an article by Anita Vogt of the Indian Civil
Rights Task Force. 7 That history, as briefly summarized, stated:
1. On April '7, 1929, "the Civil Service Commission approved the
limitation of preference to those Indians registered at some Indian
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agency and to Indians of one-fourth or more Indian blood. These
limitations did not, however, appear in the Civil Service rules." They
appeared in the Minutes of the Civil Service Commission.
z. On January 3i, 1932, the Interior Department issued regula-
tions governing appointments in the field services which "included
the limitation to Indians registered at Indian agencies but not the
one-quarter blood limitation."
3. On April 14, 1934, approximately two months prior to passage
of the IRA, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 6676. That
order contained "the first formal declaration of the quarter degree
requirement."
That order amended the Civil Service rules, Schedule B (posi-
tions which may be filled upon noncompetitive examination) to
include "[p]ositions in the Indian Service not now excepted from
examination under Schedule A, where the applicants are of one-
fourth blood."
The exemption of Indians from competitive examination had
little effect because the qualifications under the noncompetitive ex-
aminations were generally the same as for the competitive service.38
The Indians still had no access to education, and the paternalism of
the Indian agents remained as strong as ever.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 was designed to put an
end to the absolute discretion vested in the executive and administra-
tive officials and revest the Indian tribes with the sovereign powers
which the federal government had usurped from them.39 The princi-
pal policy behind the Act was to terminate the system of bureaucratic
superintendence over Indian affairs and to create a system of local
self-government and self-determination. Indian employment prefer-
ence was considered a critical element in achieving this goal.40
Analysis of the Legislative Intent of the IRA
Section 1z of the Indian Reorganization Act of '934 was the sixth
statutory attempt to accord preference to Indians in the space of a
century.41 Section 1.2 of the IRA states:
The Secretary of the Interior is directed to establish standards of
health, age, character, experience, knowledge, and ability for In-
dians who may be appointed, without regard to civil-service laws,
to the various positions maintained, now or hereafter, by the
Indian Office, in the administration of functions or services affect-
ing any Indian tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have
the preference to appointment to vacancies in any such positions.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1976
The bill which was finally enacted was a series of compromises
between the originally drafted bill and numerous House and Senate
revisions. For this reason the legislative history of the IRA must be
read with great caution and with a comprehensive understanding of
the bill as originally drafted and as finally enacted.
The Wheeler-Howard Bill, or IRA, was initially drafted and ad-
vanced by the Department of the Interior and the Indian Bureau.4"
In this sense it was an administration bill rather than a congressional
bill. The chief proponent of the bill was John Collier, Commissioner
of Indian Affairs. For this reason great weight shall be given to the
views expressed by Interior Department and agency officials.
The original bill was divided into four major titles." These titles
were the following: Title I-Indian Self-government; Title II-
Special Education for Indians; Title III-Indian Lands; Title IV-
Court of Indian Affairs. Only Title I is of direct consequence to the
scope of this article. It dealt with the implementation and scope of
two major policies of the Act which are really the heart of the
legislation. The first policy was to allow Indians the right to organize
into chartered communities for the purpose of self-government. The
second policy was to transfer the administration of the functions and
services from the Department of the Interior and Office of Indian
Affairs to the Indian tribes themselves. Sections 7 and 8 of Title 14"
were the provisions designed to implement this transfer. The pur-
poses of this proposed transfer of functions were tvofold: (1) to
eliminate the abuse of discretion and usurpation of power by federal
administrators;46 and (2) to restore to Indian tribes self-determina-
tion by allowing them to administer the service of their own people
without application of the Civil Service laws that had frustrated their
participation under the early preference laws.47
Sections 7 and 8 of Title I of the original bill did not specifically
provide for preference for Indians and, in this sense, were not true
preference provisions. They also did not specifically provide for ex-
emption of Indians from Civil Service laws. However, they were
intended to accomplish both. The way this was to be accomplished
was by providing that the Secretary of Interior transfer to the Indian
communities or reservations, chartered under the Act, the various
functions and services formerly performed by the Interior Depart-
ment and the Indian Office.48
The Indian communities or reservations would be by definition
"Indian," thus Indian preference would occur de facto. In addition,
because the functions and services were going to be transferred to the
tribes themselves, there would be no applicability of Civil Service
laws. As Commissioner Collier pointed out:
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The bill goes further, and states that the Secretary of the Interior
must set up the qualifications for all types of Indian service,
employment on reservations, and Indians may qualify under those
qualifications. It is practically a civil service for Indians. An Indian
who demonstrates that he is qualified under those qualifications
may then be put into the job and the white man moved out some-
where else.49
As the hearings on the original bills progressed in both the House
and Senate Committees on Indian Affairs, it became increasingly
apparent that many of the features of the original bill were objection-
able, especially to members of the Senate Committee. The House
Committee attempted a conservative piecemeal approach to amend-
ing the bill, while the Senate Committee took more drastic action
and set up a subcommittee composed primarily of those Committee
members opposed to many of the provisions of the original bill. This
subcommittee hastily redrafted the bill and on May 17, 1934, the
new bill, renumbered S. 3645, was presented to the full Committee
for continued hearings.50
When the new bill, S. 3645, was initially presented to the full
Committee, the transfer of functions and services provision had been
altered so that instead of a simple transfer provision, Section 9 of the
new bill provided that the tribes could "contract with the Secretary
of the Interior for the performance of functions and services now
rendered by the Office of Indian Affairs."51
Section 14 of the new bill directed the Secretary of the Interior
"to establish standards of health, age ... for Indians who may be
appointed to the various positions maintained . . . by the Indian
Office.... Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the preference
to appointment to vacancies in any such positions.15 2
You will note that this section specifically provided for Indian
preference, but did not remove the applicability of the general Civil
Service laws. Presumably, there was still no need for their removal
because the tribes would actually administer the functions and serv-
ices by contracting with the Interior Department. Thus, this new
provision would not have materially affected the goals which the
original provision of Section 8 of Title I were designed to implement
(i.e., self-determination and avoidance of Civil Service laws).
Almost immediately after the new bill was read to the Committee,
opposition to the contracting provision of Section 9 surfaced and the
provision was quickly deleted from the bill. This removal of the
transferral of functions and services by contracting with the tribes
and the Committee discussion with regard to the same is of critical
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importance because it affected the entire structure and process by
which Indian preference and Indian self-determination were to be
implemented. The Committee discussion follows:
SENATOR O'MAxoNY (Interposing). Just a moment, Mr. Chair-
man. Just what is the purpose of that last power, "to contract with
the Secretary of the Interior for the performance of functions and
services now rendered by the Office of Indian Affairs"?
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. Let me illustrate with a present case. We
have just completed an organization with the Navajos of the
tribal council, whereby they assume responsibility for cleaning up
liquor, and we put at their disposal 30 Navajo Indians at a dollar
a day for horse and man, and they are going to manage that and
they promise to clean up the reservation. It would make it possible
for such a thing to be rested on a contractual basis.
THE CHAIRvMAN. Yes; but this goes much further.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. Yes; but I am illustrating. To go beyond,
there could be a contract for the maintenance of agricultural exten-
sion work.
SENATOR O'MAHoNEY. The thing that was in my mind-I confess
it may be a little bit vague at the moment-is that Congress has
imposed upon the Office of Indian Affairs the duty to perform
certain services. Now, if you carry out the law under which your
Bureau operates, you must perform those services.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. But many of those services are services
which really ought to be done by the Indians for themselves.
THE CHAIRMAN. You can do that at the present time by simply
letting the tribe, as a matter of fact, pick the men who are going to
do this particular work.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. As we have done in this case.
TiE CHAIRMAN. As you have done in this case. But I doubt seri-
ously whether or not you should say to them that they can contract
with the Secretary of the Interior for the performance of functions
and services now rendered by the Office of Indian Affairs.
SENATOR O'MAIoNEY. As the language is drawn, Mr. Chairman,
it seems to me it will be broad enough to sustain the interpretation
that the Office of Indian Affairs could charge the Indians for doing
the things which Congress has required the Indian Office to do.
THE CHAnuRAN. Yes; I think that is true.
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COMMISSIONER COLLIER. Of course, if we get to the legal section,
it creates an Indian legal service that will help us.
THE CHmIRmAN. Yes; that will help you all you need, and I suggest
that we cut out this last sentence. What you need is a civil service
(so that you can appoint Indians that are competent who cannot
pass your civil-service regulations) [sic].
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. And then remove them if they fail us.
TIm CHAmMAN. And then remove them if they fail. That is what
you need; but I do not think you need this.53
Thus, the transfer of functions to the tribes by contracting was
deleted from the bill.
The Committee apparently thought that transferring functions or
services to a tribe would be going too far. They felt that Indians
could gain control over their own affairs and thus have self-determina-
tion by merely lifting the Civil Service laws. Thus, when Section 14
of the new bill was discussed it was amended to carry out this change
in structure and implementation:
THE CHAIRMAN (reading): Section 14. The Secretary is directed
to establish standards of health, age, character, experience, knowl-
edge, and ability for Indians who may be appointed to the various
positions maintained, now or hereafter, by the Indian Office, in
the administration of functions or services affecting any Indian
tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the preference to
appointment to vacancies in any such positions.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. Line zI, Mr. Chairman, that has to be
safeguarded by the addition in line z after the word "appointed,"
the words "without regard to civil-service laws," in order to make
it perfectly certain that the laws are lifted.
THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. That is simply as a safeguard.
The Committee was fully aware that the lifting of the Civil Service
laws was unprecedented, but felt the unique relationship which
existed between the Indian Office and the Indian people justified
such action."
The Indian Office was to remain the centralized administrator of
the services and functions. Indian self-determination was to be im-
plemented through preferential appointment of individual Indians
exempt from the general Civil Service laws rather than through trans-
fer of the functions and services to the tribes.56 Thus, the switch can
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actually be characterized as a switch from "tribal preference" to
"individual Indian preference." This distinction becomes very impor-
tant in the next subsection.
A threshold issue in determining who is entitled to IRA preference
involves the interpretation of Section 18 of the IRA,'7 which pro-
vides: "This act shall not apply to any reservation wherein a majority
of the adult Indians, voting at a special election duly called by the
Secretary of the Interior, shall vote against its application."
This provision could conceivably be interpreted to exclude all In-
dians from IRA preference who are affiliated with a tribe which has
voted to reject the Act. However, the legislative history tends to
support the view that preference was to apply to the individual In-
dians regardless of whether the tribe voted to reject the Act.
A careful reading of the legislative history of the IRA indicates that
certain provisions of the Act were directed to the individual Indian
and were intended to be available to those individual Indians who
sought them. Other provisions of the IRA concerned issues affecting
tribal organization and related issues of what powers would be vested
in a tribe organized under this Act. It is my conclusion that the pro-
visions relating to tribal organization do not apply to any tribe which
voted to reject the Act; however, the provisions relating to the rights
or benefits of individuals are intended to be available to the individ-
ual Indian regardless of whether his tribe voted to reject organization
under the Act."'
Little debate occurred concerning Section 18 of the IRA and that
which was had was not carried through to adequate resolution. The
only way to illustrate my point is to quote from the debate itself
which occurred in the Senate Committee.
THE CAIRMAN (reading): Section I8. This act shall not apply to
any reservation wherein a majority of the adult resident Indians
voting in a special election in July called by the Secretary of the
Interior shall vote against its application.
I think instead of making it negative it should be put in the
affirmative.
SENATOR THOMAS (Oklahoma). "Shall not apply unless approved
by a majority vote," the same as the other.
THE CH r iUrN. Yes; "... unless approved by the Secretary." Why
do you put it in the negative What is the idea?
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. Mr. Chairman, all those parts here which
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deal with the organization of the tribes have to be affirmatively
adopted by the tribes.
Tim CHAIRMAN. Yes.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. But to extend the trust period, to make
available the educational fund, and so on, it would seem it is a
thing that ought to be operative unless the tribe does not want it.
TiE CAIRMAN. Well, but the educational fund and these others
apply.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. It says that no part of the act shall apply
if the tribe does not want it. It is comprehensive.
Tim CHIRAN. Why did you put that in?
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. That was a House amendment proposed
by the Chairman of the committee to give the Indians complete
assurance that nothing was going to be railroaded through on
them.
SENATOR O'MAHoNEY. The question was what would be the
objection to stating it in the affirmative and to say that the act shall
not apply except where it has been adopted by the Indians?
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. Because we get a case like this: Take in
Senator Thomas' area: Maybe the majority of the Cherokee Na-
tion would be interested enough in this to vote on it, but there are
landless Cherokees whom we would want to colonize and we
ought not to make them wait until we round up the Cherokee
Tribe and get them to vote. They might never vote. And insofar as
the Cherokee Tribe is indifferent to the matter, its indifference
ought not to prevent the help being extended to the landless
Indians and educational aid being extended to the Indian young
people. If the tribe is interested enough to vote against it, then that
is something else.
THE CHAIRMAN. What provision have you in reference to it now?
Give us an illustration on one.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. The buying of land, for example, for
landless Indians and putting them on a colony. We would not
want to compel them to wait until an indifferent tribe widely
scattered got together and voted in favor of a thing being done
for them. We have right now hundreds of Indian young people
waiting for a chance to go to college. We ought to be allowed to
go ahead and put them in.
Tim CHIRMAN. You can put them in regardless of whether this
provision is in or not.
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COMMISSIONER COLLIER. No; but it says this act shall not apply.
SENATOR O'MAHoNEY. Yes; but your election is not held until
after a petition.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. As a matter of fact, that section was put
in at a time when there was controversy on different features of the
bill, and the whole section could now go out.
THE ClAIRMAN. I do not see the necessity of it.... For instance,
why should you want to put in this act that you could not educate
these children without a majority of the Indians on the reservation
voting for or against it?
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. They would not.
THE CHI AN. I do not see any necessity for that at all.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. The whole section i8 could go out.
TiE CHAIRMAN. I think if you had it in there as you had it before
this would be quite a different thing, but I think this simply com-
plicates your bill.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. I agree with you.
SENATOR THOMAS (Oklahoma). The only thing this does as it
stands today is to provide a legal way for the Indians who do not
want to get into the act to get out from under its operation.
THE: CI-IAIRM. Yes; but in each instance the previous provisions
provide that before the provision shall apply they shall take a
majority vote. Now, they vote on the proposition of the tribal
council, and so forth, and the only thing else that is left in there is
the education of them, and certainly you do not want to have a
majority vote as to whether or not you are going to educate any
of these; and you do not want to have a vote as to whether you are
going to buy some more land, do you?
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. No."9
The debate on Section i8 ended here as the Committee became side-
tracked on another issue.
While the issue was never conclusively resolved or further debated,
it seems clear that the members of the Committee were against the
application of Section 3.8 to those provisions of the Act which pro-
vided benefits for the individual Indian. The last exchange between
Chairman Wheeler and Commissioner Collier, supra, appears to
make it clear that the educational training of individual Indians is
not intended to be dependent on the tribal vote.
The educational training which is provided for under the Act is
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directly tied to Indian preference. The purpose of providing the
educational training is to enable Indians to be able to qualify for
positions within the Indian Service. Thus, it would be absurd to
educate and train Indians under the Act and then deny them prefer-
ence in employment for the very positions they had trained for.
The policy consideration behind Section i8 as explained by Com-
missioner Collier, "to give the Indians complete assurance that noth-
ing was going to be railroaded through on them," is completely
assured if Section 3.8 is read to apply only to those provisions affecting
tribal interests as opposed to individual interests. It is completely
within the discretion of the individual Indian as to whether (s) he
wants to take advantage of the provisions of the Act relating to educa-
tion and preference.60
To interpret Section 18 to exclude those Indians who belong to a
tribe which voted to reject the Act would not, however, make those
Indians ineligible for preference. They would still be eligible under
the earlier preference laws.8' However, BIA and IHS could impose
regulations restricting who is entitled to preference under these early
preference laws. Also, these early laws do not exempt Indians from
application of the Civil Service laws as the IRA does. This could
result in one set of criteria for IRA Indians and another quite differ-
ent set of criteria for Indians belonging to tribes which had rejected
the IRA. This situation would make little sense and might further
frustrate the overall IRA policy of getting Indians into their own
service.6 2
Current BIA and IHS Administrative Standards
Conflict with Language of IRA
Section 1963 of the Indian Reorganization Act made the Act differ-
ent from any of the preceding Indian preference statutes (and in-
deed different from all but a few federal statutes up to that time) by
providing within the Act a legislative definition of "Indian" for pur-
poses of the Act. Section 19 of the IRA states in relevant part:
The term "Indian" as used in this Act shall include all persons of
Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe
now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descen-
dants of such members who were, on Junei, 13934, residing within
the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further
include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood. For the
purposes of said sections, Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of
Alaska shall be considered Indians.
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Section 19 makes no reference to any one-quarter blood limitation.
The current policy of the BIA in according Indian preference is
contained in the BIA Manual. It provides in relevant part: "To be
eligible for preference, an individual must be one-fourth or more
degree Indian blood and be a member of a Federally-recognized
tribe."6 4
The IHS policy is stated, in part, by an IHS circular issued in
1971.65 The circular cites all of the general preference statutes and
then cites an Executive Order issued by President Roosevelt on
January 30, 1939,66 as authority for imposing a one-fourth blood
requirement in according preference.
In actual practice IHS, like BIA, further requires "membership
in a federally recognized tribe" although this IHS membership re-
quirement does not appear to be published. Thus, both BIA and IHS
currently require the twofold standard of one-fourth Indian blood
and membership in a federally recognized tribe before according
Indians employment preference. These standards appear to be incon-
sistent with the statutory language and legislative intent of the IRA.0
Section 19 of the IRA clearly defines who is to be considered an
"Indian" for purposes of IRA preference. The definition in Section
19 of the IRA established three categories or classes of "Indian"
entitled to preference. The first class is "all persons of Indian descent
who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal
jurisdiction." I shall refer to this class as the membership class. The
second class is "all persons who are descendants of such members
who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries
of any Indian reservation." I shall refer to this class as the descendant
class. The third class is "all other persons of one-half or more Indian
blood." I shall refer to this class as the unaffiliated half-blood class.
The administrative requirement of membership in a federally
recognized tribe is in conflict with both the descendant class and
unaffiliated one-half blood class as defined in Section 19. Section 19
imposes a membership requirement only on the first class, the mem-
bership class. However, that provision does not require membership
for either the descendant class or the unaffiliated one-half blood class.
Thus, by requiring membership in a federally recognized tribe, the
administrative policy totally excludes the descendant and the un-
affiliated one-half blood classes from preference contrary to the plain
language of the Act.
In fact, the administrative requirement of one-fourth degree In-
dian blood is in conflict with all three classes of Indians defined in
Section 19. The membership class speaks to "all members of Indian
descent," the descendant class speaks of "all descendants" of the
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membership class living on a reservation on June 1, 1934, and the
unaffiliated one-half blood class speaks to "all other Indians of one-
half or more Indian blood." Thus, the administrative practice of
requiring one-fourth blood imposes an additional requirement on
the membership class and would also modify the descendant and
unaffiliated classes if they were not already excluded by the adminis-
trative membership requirement.
Detailed analysis of the purposes and legislative history of the Act
demonstrates that, contrary to current BIA and IHS policy, Indians
are entitled to IRA preference who fall within any of these classes:
(1) the unaffiliated one-half blood classes; (2) the descendant class,
provided, however, that they are descendants of members of a feder-
ally recognized tribe and were themselves actually residing on June L,
1934, within the boundaries of an Indian reservation; and (3) In-
dians who are members of a federally recognized tribe who are less
than one-fourth degree Indian blood.
Legislative Intent of the IRA
The original bill did not include a comprehensive definition of
"Indian," rather, each of the four titles either contained its own
definition of "Indian" or specified in some descriptive fashion to
whom the title was to apply.68
Section 33 (b) of Title 119 provided the following definition to
specify to whom organizational charters could be issued:
[A]ll persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized
Indian tribe, band, or nation, or are descendants of such members
and were on or about February 1, 1934, actually residing within
the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further
include all other persons of one-fourth or more Indian blood....
This definition is substantially the same as the one finally enacted in
Section 19 of the IRA. 0
Section I of Title 1171 specified that special training and education
were to be made available to "Indian members of chartered com-
munities and other Indians of at least one-fourth blood."
Section 38 of Title 11172 concerning lands for "members of an
Indian tribe" specified that that phrase "shall include any descen-
dants of a member permanently residing within an existing Indian
reservation."
When the Senate subcommittee redrafted the original bill and
reported out the new bill, S. 3645, there were no separate titles and
there was only one definition of "Indian" for purposes of the Act.
Section 217' of the newly redrafted S. 3645 provided:
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The term "Indian" as used in this act shall include all persons of
Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe,
and all persons who are descendants of such members who were,
on or about June 3, 1934, actually residing within the present
boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all
other persons of one-fourth or more Indian blood.
Except for some minor redrafting, the new definition was not materi-
ally different from the one provided in Section 13 (b) of Title I of the
original bill.74 Therefore, it is safe to look to the discussions concern-
ing the meaning of this latter definition as it was debated in both the
original and redrafted bills.
The Senate hearings are very enlightening with regard to whom the
definition of "Indian" was to include. Those hearings demonstrate
conclusively that there was to be no blood quantum limitation for
either the membership class or the descendant class.
Discussing the membership class, Senator Thomas of Oklahoma
points out:
[T]his makes an Indian out of a person who has, say, one sixty-
fourth or double that amount. "The term 'Indian' as used in this
act shall include all persons of Indian descent" without regard to
further blood.
THE CHAIRMAN. That does not change the present law at all.75
Then switching the discussion to the descendant class:
SENATOR THOMAS. Then, on page o,... it says "and all other
persons who are descendants of such members."
THE CHAjRMAN. Yes.
SENATOR THoMAS. Well, if someone could show that they were a
descendant of Pocahontas, although they might be only [a] five-
hundredth Indian blood, they would come under the terms of this
act.
COMMISSIONR COLLIER. If they are actually residing within the
present boundaries of an Indian reservation at the present time.70
The above debates demonstrate conclusively that the Committee
was very aware that no minimum blood quantum was to be placed
upon either the membership class or the descendant class. Indeed,
the debates demonstrate that a person of as little as "one sixty-fourth"
Indian blood could be included in the membership class and a
person of as little as a "five-hundredth" Indian blood could be
included in the descendant class.
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The nonapplicability of a blood quantum to either of the first two
classes is further demonstrated in this exchange between Senator
Wheeler and Oliver La Farge, President of the National Association
of Indian Affairs:
THE CHArRmAN. They would all be wards under this bill, would
they not?
MR. LA FARGE. All tribal Indians or Indians organizing under this
form, coming under the qualifications this bill sets up (of residence
on the reservation, or degree of blood) which is very distinctly
defined.
Tm CiAmmAN. Your idea is that only quarter-blood Indians could
come within the provisions of this law; is that correct?
MR. LAFA aE. No; as I understand it, by the bill it is partially
covered by quarter-blood and partially by certain residence quali-
fications, in cases where individuals of lesser blood are living the
reservation life, or living in situ at the present time. That seems to
be necessary in the case of men who, from the blood point of view,
we would think are white men, but who have been brought up in
such a manner that, for all purposes of dealing with the outside
world, are Indians.77
Thus, it can be seen that Indians who otherwise meet the terms of
the first two classes are not to be excluded on the basis of degree of
Indian blood. The membership definition can generally be described
as a social/political definition, the descendant definition as a social
definition, and the unaffiliated one-half blood definition as a racial
definition. As John Collier explained to both the Senate and House
committees: "The object of this definition is to include all Indian
persons who, by reason of residence, are definitely members of Indian
groups, as well as persons who are Indians by reason of degree of
Indian blood. 78
It is just as clear that membership in a tribe is not to be required
for the descendant class. The descendant class does not require mem-
bership by virtue of the very language used in the Act. If membership
were required for the descendant class, there would be no descendant
class. The current BIA and IHS policy of requiring membership
before according preference completely reads out the statutory inclu-
sion of the descendant class. Any denial of preference to an Indian
who is a descendant of a member of a federally recognized tribe is in
violation of the law.
It is equally clear that membership in a federally recognized tribe
is not to be imposed upon the unaffiliated one-half blood class. The
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discussion of this issue will of necessity also include a discussion of
the intent of the modifying language "now under Federal jurisdic-
tion" used in the membership class definition. The two issues are so
interconnected that it is impossible to discuss them separately.
The words "now under Federal jurisdiction" were added to Sec-
tion 3.9 of the statute as a limitation upon and protection against
unduly expanding the membership class. The Senate Committee
thought that the unrestricted language, "members of any recognized
tribe," would be interpreted to include members of nonfederally
recognized tribes (i.e., state recognized tribes or Indians merely living
in a tribal manner but without any political relationship with the
federal government). The Committee did intend to include some of
the nonrecognized Indians within the Act. However, because they
were opening up the provisions of the Act to Indians who heretofore
had not been included in special Indian legislation, they wished to
carefully limit the potential number of new Indians to be included.
The language, "and shall further include all other persons of
one-half or more Indian blood," was intended to extend the pro-
visions of the Act beyond the federally recognized Indians to the
nonfederally recognized Indians, while at the same time limiting this
new class of Indians to only those of one-half blood. However, since
the unmodified language, "members of any recognized tribe," could
have conceivably been interpreted to include members of nonfeder-
ally recognized tribes as well, and because there was no blood
quantum limitation imposed upon the membership class, the mem-
bership class definition might allow any nonfederally recognized
tribes as well, and because there was no blood quantum limitation
imposed upon the membership class, the membership class definition
might allow any nonfederally recognized tribal Indian, regardless of
degree of blood, to come under the Act. This would have defeated
the intention to limit inclusion of nonfederally recognized Indians
to those of one-half blood or more.
The debates in the Senate Committee demonstrate each of these
points.
SENATOR THOMAS. Then the bill would require another section.
It would be construed so that no Indians could have the benefit of
this act unless they come under it in the form of a charter.
Tm CHxi R. No; I do not see that at all.
SENATOR THOMAS. That distinction is not made here. For example,
roaming bands of Indians are not covered by this provision. If
they are not a tribe of Indians they do not come under it. And we
have in my State a great many numbers of Indians that are prac-
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tically lost. They are not registered; they are not enrolled; they are
not supervised. They are remnants of a band. Yet as I see it they
could not come under this act because they are not under the
authority of the Indian Office, and Mr. Wilbur, when he was
Secretary, said he was not looking for more Indians. The policy
then was to not recognize Indians except those already under
authority. They refused to enroll any more, and the Indians out-
side could not come into the rolls, even full-bloods.
THE CHI UMAN. They do not have any rights at the present time,
do they?
SENATOR THOMAS. No rights at all.
THE CHAIRMAN. Of course, this bill is being passed, as a matter
of fact, to take care of the Indians that are taken care of at the
present time.
SENATOR FRAZIER. Those other Indians have got to be taken care
of, though.
THE CHAIRMAN. Yes; but how are you going to take care of them
unless they are wards of the Government at the present time?
SENATOR THOMAS. Take, for example, the Catawbas in South Caro-
lina where we visited. I think that is the most pathetic and deplor-
able Indian tribe that I have discovered in the United States. I
think the Seminoles in Florida should be taken care of. They are
in bad circumstances. They are just as much Indians as any others.
TE CHAIMni,. There is a later provision in here I think covering
that, and defining what an Indian is.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. This is more than one-fourth Indian
blood.
THE CHAIRMAN. That is just what I was coming to. As a matter of
fact, you have got one-fourth in there. I think you should have
more than one-fourth. I think it should be one-half.
In other words, I do not think the Government of the United
States should go out here and take a lot of Indians in that are
quarter bloods and take them in under the provisions of this act.
If they are Indians of the half-blood then the Government should
perhaps take them in, but not unless they are. If you pass it to
where they are quarter-blood Indians you are going to have all
kinds of people coming in and claiming they are quarter-blood
Indians and want to be put upon the Government rolls, and in my
judgment it should not be done."'
Thus, the intent was not to limit the Act to only those Indians who
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are members of a chartered community. Rather, the Act was in-
tended to include Indians who are in no way affiliated with any
federally recognized tribe provided they are "one-half blood Indian
or more." As the above debates point out, the Committee was fully
aware that they were including Indians within the provisions of the
Act which formerly had "no rights at all."
The debates continued along this line and the inevitable problem
arose concerning the possible interpretation of "recognized tribe" to
mean nonfederally recognized as well as federally recognized.
THE CHAIRMAN (reading): The term "tribe" wherever used in
this act shall be construed to refer to any Indian tribe, band, na-
tion, pueblo, or other native political group or organization.
SENATOR THOMAS. That would take in the Spanish-American citi-
zens of New Mexico, who are not now considered Indians.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. If you stop at the word "pueblo" then
you see all of those things are recognized as tribes.
SENATOR THOMAS. Under this language would this not cover into
the Department under its jurisdiction the Catawbas and Miamis?
THE CHAIRMAN. You mean down in Florida?
SENATOR THOMAS. Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN. If they are half bloods. If they are half-blood
Indians under this law, as I understand it, it would permit the
Government to take those over.
SENATOR THOMAS. They are living on a reservation and they are
descendants of Indians and they are not half bloods.
THE CHIRMAN. If they are not half-blood Indians we should not
take them in.
SENATOR THOMAS. Some of them are practically white. They have
500 acres of the poorest land in South Carolina. The Indians al-
ways get the poorest land.
COMMISSIONER COLLIER. Are they living on it?
SENATOR THOMAS. They are living on it, and that is all they are
doing, in the State of South Carolina. The Government has not
found out they live yet, apparently [sic].
THE CHAIRMAN. They would not be affected unless they are half-
blood Indians. If they are half-blood Indians they would have to
take them over under this act.
SENATOR THOMAS. Some of them presumably are half bloods, but
most of them are not.
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SENATOR O'MAHONEY. You are sure about that, Mr. Chairman?
The first sentence of this section says, "The term 'Indian' shall
include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any
recognized Indian tribe"-comma. There is no limitation of blood
so far as that is concerned.
SENATOR FRAzIER. That would depend on what is construed mem-
bership.
SENATOR O'M aIONEY. "The term 'tribe' wherever used in this act"
-and that means up above--"shall be construed to refer to any
Indian tribe, band, nation, pueblo." Now, the Catawbas certainly
are an Indian tribe.
THE CImmm AN. You would have to have a limitation after the
description of the tribe.
SENATOR O'MAHONEY. If you wanted to exclude any of them you
certainly would in my judgment.
Tm. ClnuAN. Yes; I think so. You would have to. 0
Finally, Commissioner Collier suggested a way to modify the mem-
bership class and descendant class definitions with their unrestricted
blood quantums so that those two classes are limited to only federally
recognized tribes, thus limiting the nonfederally recognized tribal or
unaffiliated Indians to be covered exclusively by the one-half blood
definition.
COMMIISSIONER COLLIER. Would this not meet your thought,
Senator: After the words "recognized Indian tribe" in line i insert
"now under Federal jurisdiction"? That would limit the act to the
Indians now under Federal jurisdiction, except that other Indians
of more than one-half Indian blood would get help.8'
In the case of Maynor v. Morton,82 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia has very recently agreed that mem-
bership is not required for unaffiliated one-half blood Indians and
that they are entitled to the same benefits under the IRA as federally
recognized tribal Indians. The case presents many interesting points.
The first point is that the Department of the Interior formally
recognized nontribal one-half blood Indians as entitled to the benefits
conferred by the IRA. In 1938, 209 Indians referred to as "Lumbee
Indians""3 contacted the Interior Department for the designed pur-
pose of obtaining certification that they were one-half blood Indians
so as to be entitled to the benefits of the IRA. The Secretary of
Interior conducted an extensive study to determine who was one-half
blood Indian entitled to IRA benefits. Only 2z of the 209 were so
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certified. 4 It wasn't until 1971, however, that any of the zz eligible
Lumbees petitioned the Secretary of the Interior to establish a
reservation for them pursuant to the IRA. The Secretary of the
Interior alleged that these 2z one-half blood Indians were not en-
titled to benefits under the IRA. One of the arguments used on
appeal in support of the Secretary's contention was that congressional
Indian legislation does not apply to individuals who are merely
racially Indian or nontribal Indian, but only to Indians who are
tribal."5
With regard to the 1938 recognition by the Secretary of the In-
terior of the eligibility of the 22 Lumbee Indians for IRA benefits, it
was argued by the government: "The statement in 1938 that Maynor,
as a non-tribal Indian, was entitled to Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA) benefits was an error. The United States is not bound by the
erroneous legal conclusions of its agents."8" The court responded:
Although the IRA was primarily designed for tribal Indians, and
neither Maynor nor his relatives had any tribal designation, organi-
zation, or reservation at that time, it is clear from the language of
the statute that some benefits of the Act were also open to any
nonreservation Indian who could prove that he possessed at least
one-half Indian blood. Among these benefits was the right to
petition the Secretary to establish a reservation for such individ-
uals, which, if granted, would afford them access to a wide range of
federal Indian services (as members of a recognized Indian group
on a reservation)."8
A memorandum to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs from the
Assistant Solicitor, Felix S. Cohen, in 1935, detailed the rights of
nontribal Indians under the IRA. The memorandum states:
Clearly, this group [Siouan Indians of North Carolina] is not a
"recognized Indian tribe now under federal jurisdiction" within
the language of section 19 of the ... [IRA]. Neither are the mem-
bers of this group residents of an Indian reservation (as of June i,
1934)- These Indians, therefore, like many other Eastern groups,
can participate in the benefits of the Wheeler/Howard Act only in
so far as individual members may be one-half or more Indian
blood. Such members may not only participate in the educational
benefits under section 11 . . . and in the Indian preference rights
for Indian Service employment granted by section 12 ... but may
also organize under sections i6 and 17 .... "
Thus, Indians not affiliated with a federally recognized tribe are
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nonetheless entitled to IRA preference provided they are at least
one-half or more Indian blood.
There is one other issue which needs to be discussed with regard
to the scope of the descendant class as defined by Section 19 of the
IRA. The descendant class is defined as "[A]ll persons who are
descendants of such members [members of a recognized tribe] who
were on or about June 3, 1934, actually residing within the present
boundaries of any Indian reservation.. ."9 This language allows two
possible interpretations. One possible interpretation is that the re-
quirement of having to have lived on a reservation "on or about June
1, 1934," applies to the member from whom the descendant de-
scends. This interpretation would make preference applicable to any
person of Indian descent who could show that he is a descendant of
any Indian member of a federally recognized tribe who was residing
on a reservation "on or about June 1, 1934." This interpretation
would allow the descendant class to geometrically increase to ex-
tremely vast numbers without regard to residency, political, or social
relation to a tribe or degree of Indian blood. I shall refer to this inter-
pretation as the open-ended descendancy interpretation.
The second possible interpretation is that the "on or about June
1, 1934," reservation residency requirement applies directly to the
descendant. This interpretation would limit the applicability of pref-
erance to a finite number of descendants. The descendant himself
would have had to have been alive and actually residing on the reser-
vation "on or about June 1, 1934." Thus, under this interpretation,
this class would eventually die out. Like the previous interpretation,
there is no requirement of political relationship to the tribe (i.e.,
membership) and no minimum blood quantum. However, the soci-
etal reservation requirement is placed directly upon the descendant
beneficiary. I shall refer to this second interpretation as the limited
descendancy interpretation.
It is my conclusion that the intent of the legislation was to have
a limited descendency interpretation rather than an open-ended
descendancy interpretation. To demonstrate the basis of this con-
clusion, it is necessary to look once again at the definition of "Indian"
as it was originally drafted in Title I, Section 13 (b) of the original
bills, S. 2755 and H.R. 7902.
The term Indian ... shall include all persons of Indian descent
who are members of any recognized Indian tribe, band, or nation,
or are descendants of such members and were, on or about Febru-
ary 1, 1934, actually residing within the present boundaries of any
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Indian reservation and shall further include all other persons of
one-fourth or more Indian blood. °
The language, "or are descendants of such members and were on or
about February 1, 1934, actually residing within the present boun-
daries of any Indian reservation," demonstrates that a twofold re-
quirement was being placed on a person in the descendant class.
First, the person had to be a descendant of a member, and second, the
descendant himself had to have been residing on a reservation on or
about February i, 1934.
The definition stated in this way, however, caused concern that
there might be confusion and that the reservation residency require-
ment might be viewed as a requirement not only upon the descendant
class but also upon the membership class and the unaffiliated one-
fourth (later changed to one-half) blood class. In order to guard
against this, the Department of the Interior offered the following
amendment specifically for the purpose of clarifying that the reserva-
tion residency requirement was applicable directly and exclusively on
the descendant and not the other two classes.
Section 15 (formerly section 13): Paragraph (b), substitute for
the phrase "persons of Indian descent who are members of any
recognized Indian tribe, band, or nation, or are descendants of
such members who were, on or about February 1, .1934, actually
residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation,"
the following phrase: "persons of Indian tribe, band, or nation, and
all persons who are descendants of such members," etc.
This amendment is designed to clarify the intent of the section
that residence upon a reservation is deemed an essential qualifica-
tion of charter members in a community only with respect to
persons who are not members of any recognized Indian tribe and
not possessed of one fourth degree of Indian blood. 1
This amendatory language was adopted, and except for the change
in the date to "June 3, 1934," it was this language which was finally
enacted into law.9
There was one other point late in the Senate hearings which again
demonstrates that the legislative intent was to impose the reservation
residency requirement directly on the descendant himself.
Speaking in regard to the descendant class, Senator Thomas re-
marked: "Well, if someone could show that they were a descendant
of Pocahontas, although they might be only a five-hundredth Indian
blood, they would come under the terms of this act.'9
Commissioner Collier qualifiedly added: "If they are actually re-
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siding within the present boundaries of an Indian reservation at the
present time."9 4 As these excerpts from the House and Senate hear-
ings demonstrate, the intent was to have a limited descendancy class
rather than an open-ended class.
Getting back to the central focus of this section, it is very clear that
the current BIA and IHS policy and practice in defining who is
entitled to preference is clearly in conflict with the Act and cannot
stand. There is nothing in the statute or the legislative history which
indicates that either the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, or the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare have any authority to alter the definition by administrative regu-
lation or practice. If the officials of the Indian Office had desired
discretion to impose additional requirements on the definition of
"Indian," they could have made that desire known and the statute
could have granted that discretion. If Congress wishes to vest discre-
tion to alter a legislative definition of "Indian" for purposes of an
act, it knows how to do so. 6 Section 19 of the IRA vests no such
discretion. The definition was carefully and fully debated and in-
tended to determine conclusively who is an "Indian" under the Act.
The language, "the term 'Indian' as used in this Act shall include... ,"
is mandatory. Any administrative attempt to alter the definition of
"Indian" violates the express statutory language and legislative his-
tory of the Act.
At the same time, the BIA Manual was altered to require mem-
bership in a federally recognized tribe as well as one-fourth Indian
blood, it was also altered to provide that the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs could grant exceptions to the preference policy by approving
the selection of non-Indians when he considered it in the best in-
terests of the Bureau."' With regard to this descretion assumed by the
Commissioner to make exceptions to Indian preference, the court
in Freeman v. Morton97 stated:
[T]he controlling statute [IRA] does not say the "Indians" ...
may have preference. It says: "... qualified Indians shall hereafter
have.., preference", and "if Congress had intended to write dis-
cretionary power into the language of Sec. 472 [Sec. 12], it would
have done so expressly.... One need only look at various Indian
preference statutes to recognize that Congress was well aware of
the distinction between discretionary and mandatory action. .. ."
The Bureau regulation defining "Indian" for purposes of eligibility
for preference likewise assumes a discretion that does not exist. The
only discretion vested in the Secretary of the Interior with regard to
preference is provided in Section z. That discretion is limited to
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establishing "standards of health, age, character, experience, knowl-
edge and ability for Indians" who shall be entitled to preference.
Nowhere in the Act is there a discretion to alter who is an "Indian."
Udall v. Tallman"8 stands for the proposition that administrative
interpretation is entitled to great weight in determining statutory
language. To adhere to the administrative interpretation in this
instance, however, would be to rewrite the law. The BIA and Interior
officials were responsible for promulgating the IRA definition of
"Indian" and were instrumental in clarifying its scope. It would be
generous indeed to characterize the present BIA and IHS policies
and practices as a misinterpretation of the Act. In any event, in order
for an agency interpretation to be granted deference, it must be con-
sistent with the congressional purpose.90 Any ambiguities should be
resolved in favor of the Indians. 00
Furthermore, in addition to not being consistent with the Act, the
policies and practices of BIA and IHS in defining who is eligible for
preference are procedurally invalid. The BIA policy is published only
in the BIA Manual, solely an internal-operations brochure intended
to cover policies that do not relate to the public.
Part of the IHS policy is published apparently only in a circular,
while the membership requirement does not appear to be published
at all. Failure to publish in the Federal Register or Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) any eligibility qualifications which affect any
substantive rights of an individual is a violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act. Such unpublished standards cannot extinguish the
rights of a person otherwise within the class of beneficiaries. 1' 1
Now the question arises as to what extent does the language, "now
under Federal jurisdiction," act to include or exclude members of
the tribes which have become federally recognized since enactment
of the IRA. There are at least three possible interpretations. Each
materially affects the number of Indians entitled to IRA preference.
The first possible interpretation is that "now under Federal juris-
diction" modifies "Indian." Under this view, only members of feder-
ally recognized tribes who were alive at the time of the enactment of
the IRA could constitute the membership class. Under this view, the
membership class would eventually die out.
The second possible interpretation is that the language modifies
"tribe." Under this view, two possible interpretations are possible.
"Any member of a recognized tribe now under Federal jurisdiction"
could mean that the membership class could be made up of Indians
who were members then as well as in the future, but the federally
recognized tribe of which these Indians are members, itself, would
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have to have been federally recognized at the time of enactment
of the IRA.
The third possible interpretation is that the language modifies
"recognized tribes" only to the extent that the membership class then
or in the future could be made up of federally recognized tribal
Indians. Under this view, "recognized tribes now under Federal
jurisdiction" would have an ambulatory meaning so that members
of tribes which have been accorded federal recognition subsequent
to enactment of IRA, as well as members of tribes which were already
federally recognized, would fall under the membership definition.
The first interpretation is the weakest. The debate in the Senate
hearings discussed supra demonstrates that the intent was to modify
the language, "recognized Indian tribe," rather than the term "In-
dian." The first interpretation would lead to an absurd result not
only in conflict with what the debates indicate, but also with the
entire legislative intent and purpose of IRA preference. °2 The first
interpretation would limit the membership class to only those mem-
bers of federally recognized tribes alive at the date of enactment of
the IRA. This would lead to the eventual termination of the member-
ship class. Thus, all subsequent members of federally recognized
tribes would not be eligible for IRA preference while unaffiliated
one-half blood Indians born after enactment of the IRA would be
eligible. It could not have been the intent of Congress to deny eligi-
bility to subsequent members of federally recognized tribes while
allowing subsequent nonfederal Indians to be eligible.
Both the second interpretation and the third interpretation are
consistent with the legislative history. However, the third interpreta-
tion seems to be more consistent with the overall preference policy.
The second interpretation would result in a double standard.
Members of pre-IRA federally recognized tribes would be eligible for
preference regardless of blood quantum, while members of tribes
federally recognized after IRA would have to meet the one-half blood
requirement. 3 Therefore, the third interpretation that "now under
Federal jurisdiction" was intended to have an ambulatory meaning
appears to be a more reasonable interpretation. As Anita Vogt, for-
merly of the Indian Civil Rights Task Force has stated,
[O]ne of the major purposes of the IRA was to encourage tribes
to organize under its terms. It seems reasonable to assume that
Congress contemplated the possibility of previously unrecognized
tribes securing Federal Recognition after passage of the act, and,
bearing in mind the general thrust of the act, it seems unlikely that
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it meant to define "Indian" in such as way as to exclude some
members of newly recognized tribes from benefits of the act.
Therefore, a non-restrictive interpretation of "now", i.e., a mean-
ing of "now and hereafter," appears to be in keeping with the rest
of the section and with the intent of the act. 4
Validity of Current Civil Service Laws with
Regard to IRA Preference
As previously stated, Section 12 of the IRA specifically provides
that the appointment of Indians under IRA preference is to be ac-
corded "without regard to civil service laws." Section 1.2 also directs
the Secretary of the Interior "to establish standards of health, age,
character, experience, knowledge and ability" for Indians. 105 These
standards were intended to be in lieu of the more rigid standards and
qualifications imposed by the Civil Service laws. 10
This clear congressional mandate to the Secretary of the Interior
to establish separate standards for appointment of Indians to the
Indian Service has never been carried out. As then Assistant Solicitor
Felix S. Cohen pointed out in 1942 in reference to Section 1z of the
IRA: "This provision contemplates the establishment within the
Interior Department of a special Civil Service for Indians alone. The
failure of the Interior Department to complete such a system has
been ascribed to lack of adequate appropriations."' 17
The Secretary of the Interior still has not established separate
standards for Indians. As the congressional hearings have demon-
strated, the lifting of the Civil Service laws was considered critical to
the implementation of Indian self-determination through preference.
Largely as a consequence of the Secretary's abrogation of his duty
to establish separate standards, the Civil Service Commission as-
sumed the authority to impose Civil Service standards for Indians
appointed to BIA and IHS.
Since enactment of the IRA, a number of executive orders have
been issued pursuant to authority vested in the President by the
Civil Service laws. These orders purport to either place certain posi-
tions in the Indian Service (BIA and IHS) in the excepted service or
place them in the competitive service. 08
The current Civil Service regulations provide that the following
positions within the Department of the Interior shall be classified
into the excepted service: "All positions of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and other positions in the Department of Interior directly and
primarily related to the providing of services to Indians when filled by
the appointment of Indians who are one-fourth or more Indian
blood." 0 9
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Substantially the same language is used with regard to IHS posi-
tions within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW): "Positions directly and primarily
related to the providing of service to Indians when filled by the
appointment of Indians who are one-fourth or more Indian blood."110
The executive orders and Civil Service regulations are blatantly
illegal. Section 12 very deliberately and clearly lifts the application
of the Civil Service laws from Indians (as defined in Section 19 of
the IRA) appointed to the Indian Service.
The legislative history of IRA clearly demonstrates that the entire
purpose of IRA preference was to avoid application of the Civil
Service laws."' Congress did not intend to pass just another prefer-
ence law. There were at least six such laws already enacted, all of
which were totally ineffectual."
Another issue which must be dealt with is the effect of the
Ramspeck Act 1 3 on IRA preference. Section I of the Ramspeck Act
reads in relevant part:
That notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, the
President is authorized by Executive Order to cover into the classi-
fied civil service [competitive service] any office or positions in or
under an executive department, independent establishment, or
other agency of the Government. ... Provided further, that the
provisions of this section shall not apply to offices or positions in
the Tennessee Valley Authority or to any positions in the Works
Projects Administration or to any position to which appointments
are made by the President by and with advice and consent of the
Senate, or to positions of assistant United States District Attorney.
The President subsequently issued Executive Order 8743 on April
23, 1941. . Section I thereof provided:
All offices and positions in the executive Civil Service of the United
States (3) those that are temporary, (2) ... (3) those excepted
from the classified Civil Service under Schedules A and B of the
Civil Service Rules, are hereby covered into the classified Civil
Service of the Government. ...
It has been argued that the Ramspeck Act as implemented by
this Executive Order has the effect of repealing that part of Section
1z of the IRA which states that Indians may be appointed "without
regard to Civil Service laws."
The Civil Service Commission has reviewed this possibility on
more than one occasion. In its Minute No. 2, of October 29, 194z,
the Commission ruled that Indians employed by the BIA were not
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brought into the classified service by the Ramspeck Act and Execu-
tive Order 8743. More recently, however, the General Counsel of the
Commission prepared an analysis of the Ramspeck Act urging that
the Act and the Executive Order operate to repeal the exemption
from Civil Service laws." 5 The Commission has apparently not
adopted this position.
It is extremely doubtful that Congress, after carefully debating
and fully realizing the need to lift the Civil Service laws in order to
facilitate Indian preference, intended to allow the Ramspeck Act to
repeal that exemption only six years after enactment of the IRA. As
the Senate and House hearings and congressional debates have
demonstrated, the whole thrust of IRA preference was to get Indians
into their own service.
The General Counsel of the Commission implied in his memoran-
dum that subjecting Indians to Civil Service laws by virtue of the
Ramspeck Act would not frustrate the intent of IRA preference be-
cause "[t]he Ramspeck Act did not operate to repeal the preference
provisions of the Indian preference statute," and Indians are covered
into the excepted service by "reason of 5 CFR 213.3112(a) (7) and
213-3116 (b) (8)." 116
The exemption provided by these current Civil Service regulations
are exactly the same as provided by Executive Order No. 6676, which
was in effect while the IRA was being debated."' It was similarly
argued in the 1934 Senate Hearings that this exemption from com-
petitive service by virtue of the Executive Order was adequate and
therefore there was no need to lift the Civil Service laws entirely." 8
That argument was found unpersuasive then and it is doubtful that
Congress had changed its mind six years later.
In addition, in the recent case of Morton v. Mancari,"0 the United
States Supreme Court flatly rejected a broadside upon IRA pref-
erence premised similarly on the repeal-by-implication doctrine. The
plaintiff/appellees in that case argued that the Equal Employment
Opportunities Act of 1972,120 which extended the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to government employment, impliedly repealed Indian pref-
erence. The Court stated as one of its reasons for rejecting the
argument:
Appellees encounter head-on the "cardinal rule.., that repeals by
implication are not favored." They and the District Court read the
congressional silence as effectuating a repeal by implication. There
is nothing in the legislative history, however, that indicates affirma-
tively any congressional intent to repeal the 1934 preference....
In the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to
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repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication
is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable. Clearly,
this is not the case here. A provision aimed at furthering Indian
self-government by according an employing preference within the
BIA for qualified members of the governed group can readily
co-exist with a general rule prohibiting employment discrimination
on the basis of race. Any other conclusion can be reached only by
formalistic reasoning that ignores both the history and purposes
of preference and the unique legal relationship between the Fed-
eral Government and tribal Indians....
"When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to
give effect to both if possible .... The intention of the legislature
to repeal 'must be clear and manifest.'" In light of the factors
indicating no repeal, we simply cannot conclude that Congress
consciously abandoned its policy of furthering Indian self-govern-
ment when it passed the 1972 amendments. 121
In light of the interpretative standards enunciated in Morton V.
Mancari, it is very doubtful that any argument alleging the implied
repeal of the critically important IRA exemption from Civil Service
laws by the Ramspeck Act would be upheld. The Ramspeck Act
on its face does not expressly withdraw the Section 12 IRA Civil
Service exemption. There is nothing in the legislative history of the
Ramspeck Act evidencing any congressional intent to repeal the
Section 12 IRA Civil Service exemption. The Ramspeck Act and
Section 12 of the IRA are not irreconcilable.
The exemption from Civil Service laws for Indians entitled to
preference is a highly specialized law designed to meet the needs of a
situation found in no other area of the federal government. As dis-
cussed before, Congress knew that it was carrying out a special exemp-
tion unlike anything that had ever been done before. 22 The highly
specialized purpose of the IRA exemption from Civil Service laws
can readily co-exist with the general purpose of the Ramspeck Act.
An additional troubling thing about the executive orders and
Civil Service regulations is that IHS (and probably BIA) have relied
on them for authority to impose a one-fourth or more quantum
limitation in according preference to Indians. 23 Even if the execu-
tive orders and Civil Service regulations were valid, they would affect
only the applicability of Civil Service standards with regard to indi-
viduals of one-fourth or more Indian blood. They do not in any
way affect the IRA definition of who is entitled to preference. The
issue of who is entitled to be accorded preference is an entirely
separate issue from who is subject to Civil Service laws. A member
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of a federally recognized tribe who is less than one-fourth blood is
still eligible for preference, even though the Civil Service laws exempt
only individuals of one-fourth or more blood from the competitive
service. IHS has apparently failed to realize this distinction. It is
probable that the one-fourth or more blood standard used by BIA in
according preference was also issued in reliance upon these executive
orders.
Subsequent Legislation Relating to IRA Preference
Although not enacted in 1934, the original IRA bills contained
provisions for the transfer of functions and services performed by
the Indian Office and Department of the Interior to the Indian tribes
themselves.2 Roughly 40 years later, on January 4,.1975, the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (Public Law
93-638) 125 was signed into law.
This Act, among other things, authorizes the contracting to the
various Indian tribes and tribal organizations, the planning, conduct,
and administration of federal Indian service programs. The new Act
is very similar in policy and goals to the earlier enacted IRA. Public
Law 93-638 is designed to allow Indians self-determination by con-
tracting as many service programs to them as they can adequately
handle. In addition, the Act provides for special training to assist
the tribes in assuming their new role. Control over the expenditure
of special educational funds for Indians is also provided for in the Act.
Conclusions
Indian preference has been frustrated by assumption of discretion
and breach of duty. The BIA has assumed the discretion to alter the
definition of "Indian." The Secretary of the Interior has failed to
establish separate standards for the appointment of Indians to the
Indian Service. The President and Civil Service have assumed author-
ity to impose Civil Service regulations upon the appointment of
Indians.
All of the above are illegal and frustrate Indian preference and
Indian self-determination. Hopefully, the review of the current pref-
erence policy which is being conducted in the Department of the
Interior will result in these matters being corrected.
Addendum
Since the submission of this article to the American Indian Law
Review, the Department of the Interior has drafted new regulations
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to govern "who is an Indian" for purposes of employment preference
in the BIA.121 The Indian Health Service has stated that it will
revise its regulations to conform with the BIA's once BIA's have
been approved. 127 These regulations substantially track the language
contained in the IRA. Based on the author's extensive discussions
with BIA officials and the Indian Affairs Division of the Solicitor's
Office at Interior, the interpretations placed on the statutory defini-
tion will be substantially the same as developed in this article. The
membership class will be without regard to blood quantum; the
descendant class will be without regard to blood quantum, but the
descendant must have been alive and living on an Indian reservation
on or about June 1, 1934; and the one-half blood class will encompass
presently nonfederally recognized Indians.
Submission of the proposed draft regulations to the Civil Service
Commission for approval continues the illegal control by the Civil
Service Commission over IRA preference.12
On March 18, 1975, Secretary Kleppe signed a letter to the Civil
Service Commission requesting a change in the Schedule A Ex-
cepted Appointment Authority. This letter contained a special cate-
gory for "(v) a descendant of an enrolled member of a currently
federally-recognized tribe whose rolls have been closed by an act of
Congress." This provision was primarily designed to apply to the
Five Civilized and Osage tribes of Oklahoma whose rolls were closed
by acts of Congress. 29 Under the previous preference standard of
one-fourth Indian blood and membership in a federally recognized
tribe, Interior and BIA had been according preference to recognized
blood descendants of 19o6 enrollees as if they were members of those
tribes. However, in reviewing their new preference policy, Interior
and/or BIA decided to begin characterizing descendants of those
enrolled members as mere descendants of members rather than actual
members of those tribes. 30 The BIA and Interior were under the
mistaken belief that the IRA preference section (2 5 U.S.C. § 472) and
definition section (25 U.S.C. § 479) were not applicable to the Okla-
homa tribes in question. Thus, they contended that under pre-IRA
preference laws'31 they had administrative authority to establish
whatever definition of "Indian" for these tribes that they wished.
This contention was later abandoned in light of 25 U.S.C. § 473
of the IRA which specifically makes applicable the preference and
definition sections of the IRA to Oklahoma tribes and specifically
makes Section 18 and other sections of the IRA 32 inapplicable to
them.
However, this presented problems for the tribes in question be-
cause Interior and/or BIA had already changed their characterization
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of Indians from these tribes who were not enrolled in 19o6 from
considering them members of those tribes to now considering them
mere descendants of members. Thus, under the IRA definition, they
would not be members of a tribe and could not qualify under the
membership class. Also, Interior contended that the reservations of
these tribes no longer existed in 1934, and thus they could not qualify
under the descendant class. The only class they could fit under would
be the one-half blood class. This caused the affected tribes great con-
cern which they conveyed to the Speaker of the House, Carl Albert.
The Speaker requested that an exception be made to allow one-fourth
blood or more descendants from the Five Civilized and Osage tribes
to be eligible for preference for a period of three years. During this
three-year period the tribes could organize either under the Okla-
homa Indian Welfare Act,13 or independent of it, and adopt mem-
bership criteria. Thereafter, persons meeting such newly adopted
membership criteria would be eligible for preference. The Seminole
Tribe recently adopted a constitution and therein defined its mem-
bership based on open-ended descendancy-tracing to a descendant
of the 19o6 roll without regard to blood quantum. It appears that the
Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Cherokee tribes will do the same. The
Creek and Osage tribes are considering a quarter-blood criterion.
Since most of the other tribes throughout the United States have a
quarter-blood or eighth-blood criterion, it may be necessary for Con-
gress to amend the membership class of the IRA to provide some
minimum blood quantum for preference, in addition to membership,
so as to prevent an inequity to those tribes who have minimum blood
quantums.-Author
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